References for Journalarticle economics

Please note: the authoritative source for references in this article is the according PDF file.

Number of references: 38

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Bornstein, G. (2008). A Classification of Games by Player Type. In: New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas, ed. by Biel, Andreas and Eek, Daniel and Gärling, Tommy and Gustafsson, Mathias, chap. 3, pp. 27–42, Springer, New York.

Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., Budescu, D.V., and Selten, R. (2008). Repeated Price Competition Between Individuals and Between Teams. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66:808–821.

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Fonseca, M.A., Huck, S., and Normann, H.-T. (2005). Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost. Economic Theory, 25:669–677.

Fonseca, M.A., Müller, W., and Normann, H.-T. (2006). Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 34:443–456.

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Hildenbrand, A. (2010). Cournot or Stackelberg Competition? A Survey of Experimental Research. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich, MPRA Paper 26845.

Hildenbrand, A. (2012). Is a "Firm'' a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment. Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Economics Discussion Paper 2012-53.

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Huck, S., Müller, W., and Normann, H.T. (2001). Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets. Economic Journal, 111:749–765.

Huck, S., Müller, W., and Normann, H.-T. (2002). To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 38:240–264.

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Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., and Oechssler, J. (2004). Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53:435–446.

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Müller, W. (2006). Allowing for Two Production Periods in the Cournot Duopoly: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60:100–111.

Müller, W., and Tan, F. (2011). Who Acts More Like a Game Theorist? Group and Individual Play in a Sequential Market Game and the Effect of the Time Horizon. Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Working Paper 1111.

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Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge.