References

This folder holds the following references to publications, sorted by year and author.

There are 54 references in this bibliography folder.

Luce, R (2010).
Interpersonal comparisons of utility for 2 of 3 types of people
Theory and Decision, 68(1):5-24.

Masin, S, Zudini, V, and Antonelli, M (2009).
Early alternative derivations of Fechner’s law
Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences, 45:56-65.

Dehaene, S, Izard, V, Spelke, E, and Pica, P (2008).
Log or linear? Distinct intuitions of the number scale in western and amazonian indigene cultures
Science, 320(5880):1217-1220.

Starmer, C (2004).
Developments in nonexpected-utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk
In: Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. by Camerer, C.F. and Loewenstein, G. and Rabin, M., Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Camerer, C (2003).
Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Siegler, R and Opfer, J (2003).
The development of numerical estimation: Evidence for multiple representations of numerical quantity
Psychological Science, 14(3):237–243.

List, J and Cherry, T (2000).
Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
Experimental Economics, 3(1):11-29.

Cameron, L (1999).
Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: Experimental evidence from indonesia
Economic Inquiry, 37(1):47-59.

Slonim, R and Roth, A (1998).
Learning in high stakes Ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic
Econometrica, 66(3):569-596.

Gescheider, G (1997).
Psychophysics: The fundamentals
Mahwah, New Jersey, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, vol. 435.

Bailey, R (1996).
Orthogonal partitions in designed experiments
Designs. Codes and Cryptography, 8(1-2):45–77.

Hoffman, E, McCabe, K, and Smith, V (1996).
On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
International Journal of Game Theory, 25(3):289-301.

Guth, W (1995).
On ultimatum bargaining experiments – A personal review
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27(3):329-344.

Straub, P and Murnighan, J (1995).
An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27(3):345-364.

Kahneman, D and Tversky, A (1992).
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4):297-323.

Roth, A, Prasnikar, V, Okuno-Fujiwara, M, and Zamir, S (1991).
Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study
American Economic Review, 81(5):1068-95.

Galanter, E (1990).
Utility functions for nonmonetary events
The American Journal of Psychology, 103(4):449-470.

Luce, R and Krumhansl, C (1988).
Measurement, scaling, and psychophysics
In: Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. by Atkinson, R. C., Herrstein, R. J., Lindgey, G., & Luce, R. D., pp. 3–73, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York.

Parker, S and Schneider, B (1988).
Conjoint scaling of the utility of money using paired comparisons
Social Science Research, 17(3):277 - 286.

Breault, K (1983).
Psychophysical measurement and the validity of the modern economic approach: A presentation of methods and preliminary experiments
Social Science Research, 12(2):187 - 203.

Deaton, A and Muellbauer, J (1980).
An almost ideal demand system
American Economic Review, 70(3):312-26.

Intriligator, M (1980).
Economic models, techniques, and applications
New Delhi: Prentice-Hall.

Kahneman, D and Tversky, A (1979).
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Econometrica, 47(2):263-91.

Galanter, E, Popper, R, and Perera, T (1977).
Annoyance scales for simulated VTOL and CTOL overflights
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 8A (Suppl.), 1..

Gescheider, G (1976).
Psychophysics: Methods and theory
Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associate, 61.