References for Journalarticle economics

Please note: the authoritative source for references in this article is the according PDF file.

Number of references: 13

Bagwell, K. (1987). Introductory Price as a Signal of Cost in a Model of Repeat Business. Review of Economic Studies, 54(3):365-84.

Bagwell, K., and Ramey, G. (1988). Advertising and Limit Pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 19(1):59-71.

Bagwell, K., and Riordan, M.H. (1991). High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality. American Economic Review, 81(1):224-39.

Bagwell, K. (1992). Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1(1):151-74.

Banks, J.S., and Sobel, J. (1987). Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. Econometrica, 55(3):647-61.

Cho, I.-K., and Kreps, D.M. (1987). Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2):179-221.

Cooper, R., and Ross, T.W. (1985). Monopoly Provision of Product Quality with Uninformed Buyers. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3(4):439-449.

Deneckere, R.J., and McAfee, R.P. (1996). Damaged Goods. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 5(2):149-174.

Engers, M. (1987). Signalling with Many Signals. Econometrica, 55(3):663-74.

Judd, K.L., and Riordan, M.H. (1994). Price and Quality in a New Product Monopoly. Review of Economic Studies, 61(4):773-89.

Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. (1986). Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4):796-821.

Spence, A.M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3):355-74.

Wolinsky, A. (1983). Prices as Signals of Product Quality. Review of Economic Studies, 50(4):647-58.