Journal Article
No. 2010-7 | February 19, 2010
Oliver Hermsen, Björn-Christopher Witte and Frank Westerhoff
Disclosure Requirements, the Release of New Information and Market Efficiency: New Insights from Agent-based Models
(Published in Managing Financial Instability in Capitalist Economies)

Abstract

We explore how disclosure requirements that regulate the release of new information may affect the dynamics of financial markets. Our analysis is based on three agent-based financial market models that are able to produce realistic financial market dynamics. We discover that the average deviation between market prices and fundamental values increases if new information is released with a delay, while the average price volatility is virtually unaffected by such regulations. Interestingly, the tails of the distribution of returns become fatter if fundamental data is released less continuously, indicating an increase in financial market risk.

JEL Classification:

G14, G18

Links

Cite As

Oliver Hermsen, Björn-Christopher Witte, and Frank Westerhoff (2010). Disclosure Requirements, the Release of New Information and Market Efficiency: New Insights from Agent-based Models. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 4 (2010-7): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-7