References

This folder holds the following references to publications, sorted by year and author.

There are 57 references in this bibliography folder.

Hausken, K (2005).
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
Public Choice, 123(1):59-93.

Hausken, K (2004).
Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange
Economic Inquiry, 42(4):572-586.

Knutsen, J (2004).
As the People Want It, Blueprint for a New Confederation
EconWPA, Public Economics(0402004).

Alesina, A and Spolaore, E (2003).
The Size of Nations
MIT Press, Boston.

Hausken, K and Knutsen, J (2002).
The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States
EconWPA, Public Economics(0205004).

Bordignon, M and Brusco, S (2001).
Optimal Secession Rules
European Economic Review, 45(10):1811-1834.

Caplan, B (2001).
Standing Tiebout on His Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments
Public Choice, 108(1-2):101-122.

Casella, A (2001).
Market Mechanisms for Policy Decisions: Tools for the European Union
European Economic Review, 45(4-6):995-1006.

Casella, A (2001).
The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions
The Review of Economic Studies, 68(1):83-108.

Frey, B, Kucher, M, and Stutzer, A (2001).
Outcome, Process and Power in Direct Democracy: New Econometric Results
Public Choice, 107(3-4):271-93.

Hirshleifer, J (2001).
The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Skaperdas, S and Syropoulos, C (2001).
Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade
American Economic Review, 91(2):353-357.

A., A, Spolaore, E, and Wacziarg, R (2000).
Economic Integration and Political Disintegration
American Economic Review, 90(5):1276-1296.

Hausken, K (2000).
Migration and Intergroup Conflict
Economics Letters, 69(3):327-331.

Garner, B (1999).
Black’s Law Dictionary
West Group, St. Paul, 7 ed.

Glomm, G and Lagunoff, R (1998).
A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods
Journal of Public Economics, 68(1):91-112.

Bolton, P and Roland, G (1997).
The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1057-1090.

Bolton, P, Roland, G, and Spolaore, E (1996).
Economic Theories of the Break-up and Integration of Nations
European Economic Review, 40(3-5):697-705.

Frey, B and Eichenberger, R (1996).
FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe
International Review of Law and Economics, 16(3):315-327.

A., A and Spolaore, E (1995).
On the Number and Size of Nations
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers(5050).

Grossman, HI and Kim, M (1995).
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
The Journal of Political Economy, 103(6):1275-1288.

Harsanyi, J (1995).
Normative Validity and Meaning of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities
In: Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms and Dag Westerståhl, vol. 134, pp. 947 - 959, Elsevier. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics.

John, P, Dowding, K, and Biggs, S (1995).
Residential Mobility in London: A Micro-Level Test of the Behavioural Assumptions of the Tiebout Model
British Journal of Political Science, 25(3):379-397.

Dowding, K, John, P, and Biggs, S (1994).
Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
Urban Studies, 31(4/5):767-797.

Wellisch, D (1994).
Interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household mobility
Journal of Public Economics, 55(2):167-184.