References

This folder holds the following references to publications, sorted by year and author.

There are 46 references in this bibliography folder.

Bird, G (2007).
The IMF: A Bird's Eye View of its Role and Operations
Journal of Economic Surveys, 21:683-745.

Eldar, O (2006).
Reform of IMF Conditionality - A Proposal for Self-Imposed Conditionality
New York University Law and Economics, Working Papers(39).

Boughton, JM (2004).
The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas that have Shaped the Institution
IMF, Working Paper(04/75).

Cordella, T and Levy-Yeyati, E (2004).
Country Insurance
IMF, Working Paper(04/148).

Lee, J (2004).
Insurance Value of International Reserves: An Option Pricing Approach
International Monetary Fund, working paper(04/175).

Stone, RW (2004).
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
American Political Science Review, 98:577-591.

Haldane, A and Taylor, A (2003).
Moral Hazard: How Does IMF Lending Affect Debtor and Creditor Incentives?
Bank of England, working paper.

Hovaguimian, C (2003).
The Catalytic E¤ect of IMF
Bank of England, working paper.

IndependentEvaluationOffice (2003).
The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea and Brazil
Washington: International Monetary Fund..

Khan, MS and Sharma, S (2003).
IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs
World Bank Research Observer, 18:227-248..

Ghosh, A, Lane, T, Schulze-Ghattas, M, Bulir, A, Hamann, J, and Mourmouras, A (2002).
IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises
Washington: International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper(210).

Laffont, J and Martimort, D (2002).
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tirole, J (2002).
Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haldane, A and Kruger, M (2001).
The Resolution of International Financial Crises
Bank of England, working paper.

Jeanne, O and Wyplosz, C (2001).
The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?
IMF, working paper(01/76).

Jeanne, O and Zettlemeyer, J (2001).
International Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Conditionality
Economic Policy:409-432.

Goldstein, M (2000).
Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?
Washington: Institute for International Economic.

Jurges, H (2000).
Of Rotten Kids and Rawlsian Parents: The Optimal Timing of Intergenerational Transfers.
Journal of Population Economics, 13:147-157.

Meltzer, A, Bergsten, CF, Calomiris, CW, Campbell, T, Feulner, EJ, Hoskins, WL, Huber, RL, Johnson, MH, Levinson, JI, Sachs, JD, and Torres, EE (2000).
Results and Recommendations of the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission
Final report to the U.S. Congress and Department of Treasury. Washington, D.C..

Rajan, RG and Zingales, L (2000).
The Tyranny of Inequality
Journal of Public Economics, 76:521-558.

Treasury, U (2000).
Response to the Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
Washington: U.S. Treasury.

Bordo, MD and Schwartz, AJ (1999).
Under What Circumstances, Past and Present, Have International Rescues of Countries in Financial Distress Been Successful?
Journal of International Money and Finance, 18:683-708.

Calomiris, CW (1999).
How to Invent a New IMF
Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Eichengreen, B (1999).
Towards a New International Financial Architecture
Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Fischer, S (1999).
On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort
Journal of Economic Perspective, 13:85-104.