The author displays the pragmatic optimism surely required when it comes to questions of a global governance overhaul. In the spirit of ongoing dialogue, I offer the following responses:

The opening effectively sounds the alarm as to the urgency of the endeavor, especially in terms of stabilizing the biosphere.

• However, I am not entirely sure that the call for a(nother) UN conference quite matches the urgency of this call to arms. Bolder action may be required, requiring creative – dare I say radical – thinking about how to not only engage, but also disrupt business as usual (including the symbolic ritualism of the UN conference) Comment: My thesis is that prescriptive approaches by thoughtful (and some less thoughtful) intellectual and policy elites, have failed. I have many preferences, but advancing them serves little purpose if they are not implemented. Experience has taught that well-intentioned top-down efforts have seen no, or few results: The High-level Panel On Threats, Challenges and Change (2003-4) that addressed future challenges to peace and security and recommended changes seen to be necessary to enable collective action including reform of the principal UN organs; and the World Trade Organization’s efforts since 2001 to complete the Doha Development Round are two outstanding examples of failure, and the long delay in implementing reforms to the quotas and voting rights of states in the IMF and World Bank, approved at the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors meeting in October 2010, undoubtedly contributed to Beijing’s decision to create its own international financial institutions – notably the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Silk Road Fund – and drive forward the OBOR (“Belt and Road”) initiative. The Paris Agreement on Climate and Agenda 2030, in contrast, were structured to give states – and within [many of] them, social partners including civil society and business interests – a voice in constructing national proposals, which were then interpreted, aggregated and synthesised within UN organs to produce tangible progress.

• Some climate specialists would challenge the focus on economic growth, sustainable or not, within a resource finite world. Climatologists, in particular, argue that we must apply ourselves to pursuing other routes to human wellbeing if catastrophic changes in the conditions of life on earth are to be averted. This may require much deeper transformation/regulation of the ideational structures which inform the current global economic system. The unequal distribution of global wealth/resources is both highly inefficient and unethical, as documented by Oxfam (eight people own the same wealth as half the world). Comment: I agree. The paper includes the following: “If respecting planetary boundaries requires new models of growth, we need (i) an ethos that legitimizes restraints on carbon emissions and excessive consumption; and (ii) new development models that enable human progress and poverty reduction, despite reductions of production, trade, transportation, and distribution.”

• As someone who works on exactly this question, I would have appreciated some more meat on the bones of how exactly we are to improve the quality of global governance and global institutions. Similarly, the claim on page 5 regarding the ‘defective state of the global polity’. Could we have a more precise statement on diagnosing the exact contours of this defect? Once we are clear on this question, we may have a better sense of what exactly is the scope for collective agreement and progress through cooperation. In turn, the question must be posed: what do we do when the limits of cooperation are reached? Comment: There is rather more discussion of this at http://www.g20-insights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Integrative-Report_Structures-and-systems-of-Global-Governance_2016-1.pdf (notably at p. 73ff)

• I would have been interested to see more explicit engagement with how transnational governance is to constraint the private power and authority of market actors. Given that many TNCs now display annual turnovers dwarfing the GDP of nation states, do we not need to move quickly towards ensuring that these entities are effectively subject to public regulation (including the potential for legal enforcement) where market failure undermines global public goods provision? Would the author agree that ultimately a shadow of hierarchy is necessary to ensure credible
commitment to cooperation? This point is partially acknowledged in footnote 9, but otherwise rather marginal. **Comment:** There is some discussion of aspect of this at [https://www.futureworldfoundation.org/Content/Article.aspx?ArticleID=6908](https://www.futureworldfoundation.org/Content/Article.aspx?ArticleID=6908)

- The FutureWorld Foundation research series and data making explicit patterns of values and norms across regions sounds fascinating. More data here in terms of the universality of underlying values as well as differences would be welcome. The claim of value relativity is a powerful one. As a human rights scholar first and foremost, I spend a lot of time refuting this claim. I believe that to the extent that human rights represent deeply-felt, shared pragmatic concerns we can speak of universality, at least in terms of the core integrity of the norm. I would be keen to learn more about what this five-year project teased out in terms of value diversity across regional settings. **Comment:** You may be interested in the research report at [https://www.futureworldfoundation.org/Content/Article.aspx?ArticleID=15477](https://www.futureworldfoundation.org/Content/Article.aspx?ArticleID=15477)

- There are some interesting policy implications here and even potential for conditional theorizing around global governance prescriptions. For example, at page 9, the notion that "we must determine at what scales collective agreement on particular outcomes is feasible" is right. This raises the prospect of specifying scope conditions, tailoring intervention to particular problems, more attention to boundary questions (levels, sectors etc) and so on. However, it also raises the thorny question: what to do when faced with a vital public good challenge which is not amenable to collective agreement at the scale required? If we overlay power onto the triadic governance structure proposed by the author, how will the global level advance "the most urgent and systematically vital issues" in situations where its intrusion into domestic politics meets hostile domestic configurations of power? **Comment:** It may not, but politics is the art of the possible. You’re familiar, I’m sure, with Dani Rodrik’s core thesis that “deep economic integration” (hyper-globalization), national sovereignty, and democratic politics cannot co-exist. (pp. 200–201, [Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox. Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, W.W. Norton & Company, 2011]. I explored some of the implications of this in [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272567352_New_Foundations_for_World_Economy_and_Global_Governance](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272567352_New_Foundations_for_World_Economy_and_Global_Governance) (p. 26 ff)

- I agree that the SDG agenda is remarkable, perhaps the most ambitious programmatic vision for global governance yet conceived. The objectives of the proposed conference I think align well with what was the animating spirit of the SDG negotiations and their substantive outcome. I would suggest we must now turn our attention more towards procedural questions of implementation, multi-level system articulation, reinforcing principled action/argumentation by public servants (international, but especially domestic), and attaching real costs to obligations of conduct to facilitate increasingly stable and well-understood obligations of outcomes. **Comment:** I agree, but first we need the conference.