Discussion Paper
No. 2013-14 |
February 15, 2013
Abstract
In this paper, the author shows how the introduction of a bargaining game structure into a standard R&D endogenous growth model can be a potential source of local indeterminacy. He also shows that on a high-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may not enhance economic growth. On a low-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may enhance economic growth.
JEL Classification
O30
L00
O41
Cite As
Chung-hui Lai
(2013). (In)Determinacy, Bargaining, and R&D Policies in an Economy with Endogenous Technological Change. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2013-14, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2013-14
Assessment
Comments and Questions
Chung-hui Lai
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reply to referee report 2
April 15, 2013 - 09:21
see attached file
Chung-hui Lai
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revised version - response to referee report 1
May 07, 2013 - 09:37
see attached file
Chung-hui Lai
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Further small remarks
May 08, 2013 - 11:33
see attached file
Chung-hui Lai
-
revised version - response to referee report 2
May 07, 2013 - 09:40
see attached file

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