Discussion Paper

No. 2013-14 | February 15, 2013
(In)Determinacy, Bargaining, and R&D Policies in an Economy with Endogenous Technological Change

Abstract

In this paper, the author shows how the introduction of a bargaining game structure into a standard R&D endogenous growth model can be a potential source of local indeterminacy. He also shows that on a high-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may not enhance economic growth. On a low-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may enhance economic growth.

JEL Classification

O30 L00 O41

Cite As

Chung-hui Lai (2013). (In)Determinacy, Bargaining, and R&D Policies in an Economy with Endogenous Technological Change. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2013-14, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2013-14

Assessment



Comments and Questions


Anonymous - Referee Report 1
April 02, 2013 - 09:09

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - Reply to referee report 1
April 15, 2013 - 09:18

see attached file


Anonymous - Referee Report 2
April 02, 2013 - 09:13

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - reply to referee report 2
April 15, 2013 - 09:21

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - Revised version
May 07, 2013 - 09:32

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - revised version - response to referee report 1
May 07, 2013 - 09:37

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - Further small remarks
May 08, 2013 - 11:33

see attached file


Chung-hui Lai - revised version - response to referee report 2
May 07, 2013 - 09:40

see attached file