

To invited reader:

Many thanks for your comments and suggestions on my paper. I have incorporated with the comments and suggestions in the following revised version. One of the highlights in this revised version is subsection “1.4 Critical investigations to revealed preference theory” that reveals revealed preference theory meaningless as a positive description (see pp. 7~11).

For the convenient reading, all revised parts have been blue-colored in the text, and the intensively revised page numbers and contents are specified below. Indeed, I would like to hear from you again.

1. pp. 4-5

“**Introduction**” has been rewritten to clearly describe what the paper actually does and what it tries to achieve.

2. pp. 5~11

The section “**1 Analytical path**” has been wholly rewritten and the psychophysical approach, Klein-Rubin utility function, and Linear Expenditure System are described in detail. Especially, it also highlights on the critical analysis on revealed preference theory. This section consists of four subsections “1.1”~“1.4” that are specified as the following:

(1) p. 6: “**1.1 Economic Attribute of Klein-Rubin utility function**”. It explains the economics foundation for Klein-Rubin utility function and the derivation for LES.

(2) pp. 6~7: “**1.2 Psychological attribute of Klein-Rubin utility function**”. It explains the psychophysical measurements for Klein-Rubin utility function.

(3) p. 7: “**1.3 Comparison between U_{LES} and U_{Est}** ”. It explains how to test utility maximization hypothesis in this paper.

(4) pp. 7~11: “**1.4 Critical investigations to revealed preference theory**”. In this subsection, a critical analysis on revealed preference theory reveals that revealed preference theory is only meaningful as a normative system but meaningless as a positive description, and the existing experimental and empirical verifications for utility maximization in revealed preference theory are wholly invalid.

3. pp. 13~14

“**2.1.2 Session B in Exp. 1**” is rewritten with more detailed and comprehensible contents.

4. p. 15

The explanation is improved to describe how to discriminate “a purely exhausting consumer” in Choices I~III.

5. p. 17

“Fig 1” is added to illustrate the bid price inquiry card used in Session B of Exp.1.

6. p. 23

“Fig 2” is added to illustrate the changed bid price inquiry card that may be used in Session B of Exp.1.

7. pp. 24~25

New contents are added to explain the necessity of discriminating the perception utility and emotion utility.

8. Other questions addressed in your report are replied here:

(1) About the instructions used in the experiment

They are presented on p.15 (the top paragraph), p.15 (the bottom paragraph), and p.17 (the bottom paragraph).

(2) About “only a minority of the subjects seem to have completed the experiments”

The subjects participating in the experiments were not previously selected, and their preferences to three kinds of kernels could be very different. The most popular three groups that delivered invalid data were, first, those who did not choose all three kernels in Choice I violating Valid Condition 4 (see the second paragraph from the bottom on p.15) for they disliked certain kernels, second, those who were judged as “purely exhausting consumers” violating Valid Condition 2 (see the bottom paragraph on p.12 and the second paragraph on p.13; for the notion of “purely exhausting consumers” please see the subsection “1.4” on pp.7~11), and, third, those who purchased below RMB3.00 in Exp. 1 or below RMB3.60 in Exp. 2 violating Valid Condition 1 (see the second paragraph from the bottom on p.12 and the fourth paragraph on p.18). In the total invalid number for all formal experiments, the first group occupied a proportion about 50%, the second about 26%, and the third about 20%. All those invalid determinants are uncontrollable in subjects’ behaviors, and it is evidently more reasonable to pick them out in the experiments than previously to rule them out before the experiments.

(3) About “why this is a cardinal utility test”

The psychophysical measures to the utility scales for U_{Est} are the cardinal measure (see He, 2012), so it is a cardinal utility test. Also see the third paragraph on p.5, the third paragraph from the bottom on p.7.

Experimental Test of Utility Maximization

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Abstract: The study tested the cardinal utility maximization hypothesis by an experimental procedure in a framework of utility scaling approach following the psychophysics-econometrics paradigm, conceived in He (*Psychophysical Interpretation for Utility Measures, 2012*). It reveals (i) the cardinal utility maximization can be tested and has been supported by experimental results; (ii) the utility scaling approach following the psychophysics-econometrics paradigm offers a new foundation to discuss the utility concept; and (iii) it is necessary to distinguish the perception utility and emotion utility to respectively describe economic choices and enjoyment choices. [A critical analysis on revealed preference theory is also highlighted, and it discloses revealed preference theory only meaningful as a normative system but not as a positive description.](#)

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Keywords utility maximization; experiment; Klein-Rubin utility function; [revealed preference](#); perception utility; emotion utility

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Introduction

If give a survey over the cardinal utility researches after 1960s, you certainly see that the cardinal utility is not as immeasurable as it had been pessimistically thought during the first half of 20th century. The successful psychophysical studies appealing us to attempt the cardinal utility measurement as a sensation scaling had appeared for a long time (e.g., Galanter, 1962, 1990; Galanter and Pliner, 1974; Galanter et al., 1977; Breaut, 1983; Parker and Schneider, 1988). A number of experimental and theoretical studies have systematically revealed the cardinal utility measurable for both commodity choice and risk choice (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; He, 2012). The base for laying out the utility theory has changed today and far differs from the times of ordinalist and revealed-preferencian pioneers or leading founders Pareto (1906), Johnson (1913), Frisch (1926), Hicks and Allen (1934), Alt (1936), and Samuelson (1938). Mainstream economics might neglect such a historical change for too long a time. This change naturally reignited a debate between cardinal utility and ordinal utility or revealed preference theories (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1997; He, 2012). It is necessary to clarify this debate before an experimental test of cardinal utility maximization can be well reasonably carried on. A critical investigation for it will be presented in Subsection 1.4.

There have been three paths presented in the literature for using data to study the utility maximization: cardinal measure, revealed preference measure, and econometric modeling approach. This paper will combine the cardinal measure with the econometric modeling approach to carry on the experimental test of utility maximization in a psychophysics-econometrics paradigm, proposed in He, 2012.

Indeed, revealed preference theory claims its success in testing the utility maximization hypothesis only by the comparisons between consumers or subjects' choices at different budget levels (e.g. Varian, 1982, 1983, 2009). That will be cleared up in Subsection 1.4 as a misunderstanding. Here we focus on the relationship between cardinal utility measure and econometric modeling approach.

Conventional cardinal utility measure came from Bentham tradition, following the hedonic interpretation for economic utility and often leading to psychological discussions today. Econometric modeling approach bases on the general statistical framework or utility maximization framework, and this paper will follow the latter, which belongs to marginal analysis tradition and always reveals parametric relationships fitted to empirical observations. The cardinal utility measure and the econometric modeling approach had always been departed from one another in the history. To clarify the isolation between them, it is helpful to briefly review the earlier utility thoughts.

The modern utility thought originated from Bentham's nominal measures of pleasure, happiness, and etc (Bentham, 1789). Bentham's outstanding contribution to the utility theory was to make the utility concept be viewed as a numerical magnitude, not by any successful measurement but by repeated fruitless discussions (e.g. Stigler, 1950). If no utility maximization hypothesis jointed since Gossen (1854), the utility thought would stay mainly as an academic language decoration and would never become one of core thoughts in economics. It was the utility maximization reasoning to combine the nominal hedonic measures deeply with the marginal analysis and to root the utility discussion deeply into economics. It changed the language of utility analysis into a more precise, complicated, and abstruse natural science form in its reasoning aspect, but in its pioneering era, never approached to another characteristic of natural science: test a hypothesis in the experiment. [The relationship between the hedonic concept of economic utility and the utility maximization in econometric models has never been verified by any empirical or experimental observations, and it is only a preconception inherited](#)

from Bentham.

For a long time, the utility maximization analysis was departed into two isolate domains in the cardinal utility exploration: one is the experimentation that concerns with the psychological hedonic aspect and terminates to change non-quantitative intuitive hedonic experiences into quantitative psychological analyses (e.g., Breaut, 1983; Kahneman et al., 1997), related to Bentham's tradition; and the other is the econometrics that concerns with the economic money aspect and starts from theoretical construction of utility function to explore the utility maximization model for describing market monetary distribution behaviors (e.g., Klein and Rubin, 1947; Stone, 1954; Liuch, 1973; Houthakker, 1960; Theil, 1965; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), related to the marginal analysis tradition. For experimentalists the utility seems a hedonic feeling somehow to relate with the money distribution in one's economic concern, while, for econometricians the utility is only a mathematical function " u ", which can be maximized, somehow to involve one's hedonic feelings. This is of the realistic pictures for the utility research differently between experimentalists and econometricians. Such a demarcation cut the complete utility maximization issue into two irrelevant halves, and made either experimentation or modeling approach fail to deal with a complete behavioral process in the utility maximization. It truly disabled the test of cardinal utility maximization.

He, 2012 has theoretically and experimentally verified that the maximized Klein-Rubin utility function (Klein and Rubin, 1947; Geary, 1950) in econometric model Linear Expenditure System (LES) (Stone, 1954) is the linear combination of subjective quantities of commodities, derived from one's cardinal sensation response rather than Bentham's emotional measures. That is, utility is a cardinal sensation measure to the commodity quantity when it is maximized in an econometric model. Miscomprehending the maximized utility as Bentham's hedonic one is a substantial barrier isolating the cardinal utility measure from the econometric modeling approach.

We have cleared away the obstacles and paved the way for the combination of cardinal utility measure and econometric modeling approach to experimentally test the utility maximization hypothesis in a framework associating sensation scaling in commodity choices with parametric estimation in the econometric model. We have come to a time to relook at the cardinal utility maximization hypothesis through the experimental insight.

Section 1 describes the rationale underlying this study, and it will also highlight on a critical investigation to revealed preference theory. Section 2 will report in detail how such a test was designed and had been performed in an experimental procedure during March and April, 2012. And Section 3 presents the experimental results.

This study revealed that the cardinal utility maximization holds in subjects' choice behaviors in a three-commodity bundle at the acceptable level of $R^2 \geq 0.97$ for the curve fitting. Waiting for one hundred and fifty-eight years, Gossen's genius is firstly supported by experimental evidences. More important for resent economics, such an experimental study indicates a new analytical framework for economics, which will be discussed in Section 4 that also summarizes and discusses the findings.

The data sets and appended mathematical derivations are presented in Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>.

1 Analytical path

There are two experimental ways to independently determine a Klein-Rubin utility function. One is to solve LES in experimental data for the Klein-Rubin utility function. Another, proposed in He, 2012, is

to estimate the utility scales for respective commodities by psychophysical measures, then put them into a linear combination to derive a Klein-Rubin utility function. The former utilizes the economic attribute of the Klein-Rubin utility function, and the latter the psychological attribute of the Klein-Rubin utility function. The present experimental test of utility maximization will be realized through a comparison between the Klein-Rubin utility functions obtained from the two ways.

On the other hand, following Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982)'s conceptions, revealed preference theory had stepped into the same issue in its own comprehension. We shall inevitably encounter the disputation between cardinal utility description and revealed preference theory in this section.

1.1 Economic Attribute of Klein-Rubin utility function

Satisfying the following three constraints in the consumer theory:

1) Budget constraint

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i = e,$$

2) Utility maximization condition

$$\frac{\partial u / \partial q_1}{p_1} = \frac{\partial u / \partial q_2}{p_2} = \dots = \frac{\partial u / \partial q_n}{p_n},$$

and 3) Slutsky equation

$$\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_j} = -q_j \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial e} + s_{ij},$$

a utility function U describing consumer's choices in an n -commodity bundle, called Klein-Rubin utility function, is derived as

$$U = \sum b_i \ln(q_i - r_i), \quad i=1,2,3,\dots,n,$$

where r_i is the constant for commodity i , $b_i = \frac{p_i(q_{mi} - r_i)}{\sum p_i(q_{mi} - r_i)}$, and q_{mi} , $i=1,2,3,\dots,n$, is the quantities maximizing utility U (Klein and Rubin, 1947; Geary, 1950).

By maximizing the Klein-Rubin utility function in Lagrange's approach, an econometric model called Linear Expenditure System (LES) can be obtained (Stone, 1954):

$$p_i q_i = p_i r_i + b_i \left(\sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i r_i \right), \quad i=1,2,3,\dots,n.$$

LES is a multi-equation system, can be solved in empirical data, and has been a fruitful theoretical model describing consumers' commodity purchases in numerous empirical statistics (e.g., see Intriligator, 1980). Following its successful applications in the empirical study, we will utilize LES to the experimental quantity choices q_i in a commodity bundle with assigned prices p_i . By solving LES for b_i and r_i in experimental data of p_i and q_i , the Klein-Rubin utility function will be determined for experimental samples. Below, denote U_{LES} as the Klein-Rubin utility function experimentally derived from LES.

LES is the result of maximizing the Klein-Rubin utility function, and thus, U_{LES} is the utility function theoretically required by the utility maximization for the chosen commodity bundle in the experiment.

1.2 Psychological attribute of Klein-Rubin utility function

With a systematic psychophysical interpretation, He, 2012 looked into the Klein-Rubin utility function

from a new sight of perceptual process, which focus on one's intuitive measure on the objective commodity quantity. It has revealed in He, 2012 by combining mathematical demonstration and experimental measurement that the Klein-Rubin utility function is a linear combination of intuitive utility scaling values (logarithmic laws) for economic quantity $q_i - r_i$, and the Klein-Rubin utility maximization is essentially the maximization of subjective measure on commodity quantities. This psychological attribute enables us to measure the Klein-Rubin utility function in a psychophysical procedure. According to the discussion in He, 2012, the psychophysical measurement procedure includes three steps:

1) Separately measure subjects' utility scales $u_i = c_i \ln(q_i - r_i) + C_i$ for each commodity i in the commodity bundle to determine the parameter r_i ;

2) Determine the values of b_i by using experimental data q_i and parameter r_i to calculate

$$b_i = \frac{p_i(q_{mi} - r_i)}{\sum p_i(q_{mi} - r_i)};$$

3) Using the obtained b_i and r_i , finally construct the Klein-Rubin utility function

$$U = \sum b_i \ln(q_i - r_i).$$

Denote U_{Est} as the Klein-Rubin utility function experimentally estimated from the psychophysical measurement procedure. Differing from U_{LES} , U_{Est} is a result of subjects' intuitive utility judgment for the commodity bundle (He, 2012).

1.3 Comparison between U_{LES} and U_{Est}

Utilizing the economic attribute and the psychological attribute, we have two experimental ways to determine a Klein-Rubin utility function. One is U_{LES} that is required by the utility maximization for a bundle of commodity choices, and another U_{Est} that is intuitively estimated by subjects' utility judgment for the same bundle of commodity choices. If U_{LES} agrees with U_{Est} , it will reveal that subjects' commodity choices agree with the result of intuitive utility judgment maximization and, therefore, the utility maximization hypothesis holds in the psychophysics-econometrics measure; otherwise, will not.

In other words, we can test the utility maximization hypothesis by a comparison between U_{LES} and U_{Est} experimentally revealed by subjects' choice behaviors in a commodity bundle. This is the analytical path the present study will follow. Combining econometric model with psychophysical measurement, it is a new research paradigm, called psychophysics-econometrics paradigm. In this research paradigm, an outstanding distinction from other discussions on the test of utility maximization hypothesis is that it is based on two different ways of estimating a utility function in the experiment.

As U_{Est} is a cardinal magnitude (He, 2012) the psychophysics-econometrics measurement will deliver a cardinal utility maximization test.

1.4 Critical investigations to revealed preference theory

The above psychophysics-econometrics paradigm is evidently distinguished from the approach proposed in revealed preference theory on the same issue (e.g. Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982). They should be compared in order to clarify the test of utility maximization hypothesis in a well-defined framework.

Quite oddly, it is extremely seldom in the literature for economists to concern with the critical investigation to revealed preference theory during its seventy-four years history since 1938 when Samuelson first proposed it, so that even if a critical glance at the initial notion of revealed preference can bring us surprising findings, which will be enough to reverse the traditional view on this theory.

Consider two commodity bundles q^1 and q^2

$$q^1 = (q_1^1, \dots, q_n^1),$$

$$q^2 = (q_1^2, \dots, q_n^2),$$

and their prevailing price set

$$(p_1, \dots, p_n).$$

Denote their budgets

$$pq^1 = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i^1,$$

$$pq^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i^2.$$

Samuelson (1938) wrote in his seminal paper firstly to introduce the revealed preference concept like this:

Suppose now that one bought q^1 . If $pq^2 \leq pq^1$, it means that he could have purchased q^2 , but he did not choose to do so. That is, q^1 was selected over q^2 . We may say that $pq^2 \leq pq^1$ implies q^1 is preferred to q^2 .

In this way, “ q^1 is preferred to q^2 ”, a subjective utility judgment, can be revealed by $pq^2 \leq pq^1$, an objective budget measure, called “revealed preference”. Although revealed preference theory has been developed by Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), and Varian (1982), it has never left such a base.

From a positive point of view, in the situation supposed by Samuelson, if one bought q^1 and $pq^2 \leq pq^1$, there are virtually two possible interpretations for such a choice. One is

q^2 was preferred to q^1 but the consumer behaved irrationally;

and another

q^1 was preferred to q^2 and the consumer behaved rationally.

Samuelson’s revealed preference concept was specially addressed only following the latter interpretation but omitting the former. Where, “rationally” merely refers to “one behaves following his preference”, while “irrationally” merely refers to “one behaves following some motivations other than his preference”. “Rationally” and “irrationally” are distinguished here by nothing but “preference”, all are normal behaviors usually. A complete notion of revealed preference implies the above two interpretations.

If we observe in experimental or empirical data that q^1 was bought and $pq^2 \leq pq^1$, we cannot certainly conclude “ q^1 was preferred to q^2 ” as Samuelson had told to us, unless the “rational” consumer is accepted as a priori; while it possibly means that q^2 was preferred to q^1 but the consumer behaved following some motivations other than his preference, i.e. so-called “irrationally”. Namely, the positive revealed preference interpretation for the observed event “a consumer bought q^1 and $pq^2 \leq pq^1$ ” always asserts that the consumer irrationalized or rationalized the data, a completely meaningless conclusion! It must imply that Weak and Strong Axioms of Revealed Preference (Samuelson, 1938; Houthakker, 1950) are meaningless too. This is the explanation naturally implied in revealed preference notion if we view it as a general positive rationale. Unless one accepts the “rational” consumer as a priori in a normative theory, he cannot conclude as Samuelson did. Samuelson’s inference is doubtlessly incomplete in the positive logics and had previously rooted a fatal hidden trouble in revealed

preference theory such that it became a congenitally deficient system since it was born.

In fact, the utility maximization is the important one but not all of a consumer's motivations for deciding his purchase choice. Utility maximization theory does not found itself upon the uniqueness of utility maximization motivation. Other motivations empirically exist and cannot be omitted for their considerable proportion in choice behaviors. For example, exhausting the whole budget is one of usual motivations easily observed in experimental and empirical processes, and to do so, from time to time a subject or a consumer at least partially neglects his preference. Such a consumer will be referred to as "a purely exhausting consumer", who is one of "irrationally behaves" mentioned in the complete notion of revealed preference.

A purely exhausting consumer will very possibly buy q^1 but q^2 is preferred to q^1 in the situation of $pq^2 \leq pq^1$. Quite a few such cases had been observed in my probing experiments conducted in 2010, and it had to be taken into account in my experimental design, in which a special program was used to discriminate the purely exhausting subjects (see Subsections 2.1.1 and 2.2.2).

In the verification for the utility maximization hypothesis in revealed preference theory, the utility maximization is converted to the revealed preference concept relying on the following definition:

A utility function $u(x)$ rationalizes a set of observations (p^i, x^i) , $i=1, \dots, n$, if $u(x^i) \geq u(x)$ for all x such that $p^i x^i \geq p^i x$. (Varian, 1982)

As has been discussed above, such a definition also suffers from mixing "rational" and "irrational" behaviors in $p^i x^i \geq p^i x$, so that, for example, any purely exhausting consumer could worm his way into the "rational" consumers in the discrimination $p^i x^i \geq p^i x$. Namely, if a set of market empirical data is interpreted as "rationalized" in revealed preference theory, it could be resulted by the "irrational" purely exhausting motivation but uncertainly by the utility maximization. In other words, one only motivated from exhausting his budget will yield the false "rationalized" data to deceive revealed preference researchers. Hence, all empirical verifications using market statistical information like Varian (1982)'s analysis on post-war consumption data are invalid or, at least, highly uncertain. Varian concluded in his paper:

"Most existing sets of aggregate consumption data are post-war data, and this period has been characterized by small changes in relative prices and large changes in income. Hence, each year has been revealed preferred to the previous years in the sense that it has typically been possible in a given year to purchase the consumption bundles of each of the previous years. Hence no 'revealed preference' cycles can occur and the data are consistent with the maximization hypothesis. This observation implies that those studies which have rejected the preference maximization using conventional parametric techniques are rejecting only their particular choice of parametric form." (Varian, 1982)

That is completely wrong. It is "revealed preference cyclical consistency" approach (Afriat, 1967; Diewert, 1973; Varian, 1982, 1983) to pave a wider gateway to utility maximization especially for "irrational" consumers, including but not restricted to the purely exhausting consumers, who had very likely sneaked into the post-war aggregate consumption data such that the empirical verification for utility maximization in those data had become impossible. It is just the failure of revealed preference theory.

The utility maximization motivation co-exists or, even, competes with other motivations in consumer choice behaviors. In the non-satiated consumption categories, in which the consumption quantities increase as the budget becomes larger, and with small changes in relative prices and large changes in increasing income, we unlikely exclude such a possibility that consumers' purely exhausting motivation will occupy or be mixed into a considerable proportion comparing to the number of utility maximization motivation. That is, the time-series aggregate consumption data, like those used in Varian's study mentioned, were perhaps yielded considerably together with the consumers' purely exhausting motivation. The verification based on those mixed data has to be thought perhaps neither a support nor a negation and considerably irrelevant to utility maximization hypothesis. Unfortunately, all such cases will be always judged as "rationalized" without discrimination in revealed preference theory. In the positive sense, the judgment of "each year has been revealed preferred to the previous years in the sense that it has typically been possible in a given year to purchase the consumption bundles of each of the previous years" is wrong. It reveals the inability of cyclical consistency approach with "irrational" cross-section data.

Furthermore, consumers' another "irrational" performance is to change their preference across the time. In this case, if consumers varied their preference every year in the post-war consumptions so that a global utility description covering all years became impossible, the cyclical consistency approach would still deliver a same utility maximization for them according to Varian, 1982, provided the consumers' budgets always increased and were all spent every year, and the relative prices had small changes in each year. That is, a utility maximization indicated by the cyclical consistency approach can be completely irrelevant to the consumers' preference but only depend on consumers' budget levels. It is evidently an unreasonable consequence. Where, so-called revealed preference fails to reveal the consumers' changed preferences across the time. In other words, it should be concluded nothing but that the consumers rationalized or irrationalized the data. This is another hidden trouble originating from the fault of revealed preference notion. It reveals the inability of cyclical consistency approach with "irrational" time-span data.

The experimental and empirical verification approach developed by Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982, 1983) completely relies upon the observation to choice behaviors at different budget levels. It more easily appeal subjects to purchase by following or mixing the purely exhausting motivation in his decisions in experimental studies. Hence, the purely exhausting motivation may be more disastrous to this approach. On the other hand, if consumers or subjects thoroughly or partially follow the purely exhausting motivation, cross-time changed preference, and other "irrational" motivations, their behavioral effect will be thoroughly or partially irrelevant to utility maximization, then their deceiving effect cannot be ruled out by revealed preference verification approach, but can be deleted by those using parametric models to verify utility maximization because the deceiving result will be judged as violating utility maximization.

Comparing to those using parametric models, revealed preference verification approach is not only without superiority to reduce purely exhausting motivation in an experimental study, but also without superiority to rule out the deceiving result in an experimental or empirical study. The fatal fault of revealed preference verification approach is just its nonparametric character.

Not only the purely exhausting motivation and cross-time changed preference, other "irrational" behaviors are also usual in choice behaviors. For example, the emotion utility judgment is another "trouble" haunting revealed preference theory for its irregular character, especially when it is mixed together with the purely exhausting motivation. The emotion utility judgment had been also avoided in

the measurement of utility scales in He, 2012 (see the discussion in Subsection 4.2). All so-called “irrational” behaviors will trouble a revealed preference description somehow in unexpected cases, during unexpected times, via unexpected ways, with unexpected forms, and by unexpected results. The most disastrous for revealed preference theory is that all those hidden troubles will be always unknown by researchers but contribute false positive descriptions to mislead them. Revealed preference theory has no any immunity against the hoodwinking from “irrational” behaviors, and will be harassed always by the everlasting suspicion that whether or not the “irrational” behaviors have duped us. That is, if a data set agrees with a parametric utility maximization model, e.g. Klein-Rubin utility function and LES, it will mean that consumers rationalize the data set; but in contrast, if a data set agrees with a revealed preference maximization model, e.g. cyclical consistency, it will only meaninglessly mean that consumers rationalize or irrationalize the data set. Essentially, the experimental test of utility maximization is to examine whether the utility maximization is one among those motivating consumers’ choice behaviors. In such a task, revealed preference theory is certainly incompetent.

In summary, only as a standard normative system revealed preference theory is possibly valid, and as a positive description it is certainly meaningless. All current experimental or empirical verifications based on Samuelson’s revealed preference concept are doomed to be invalid (e.g. Varian, 1982, 1983, 2009), whatever they seem how elegant and succinct mathematically.

The fatal defect implied in revealed preference theory is the absence of direct analysis on the attributes of preference or utility. In Subsection 4.2, we will discuss the difference between perception utility and emotion utility, which must involve the empirical natures of utility itself. As a positive description it is unsuccessful to escape from the subjective utility measure by introducing revealed preference interpretation. To overcome the fault exposed in revealed preference concept, a positive consumer behavior theory must directly look into the subjective utility or preference measure itself to explore the utility maximization hypothesis. The experimental test of utility maximization presented in this paper, involving the direct measurement and comparison of parametric Klein-Rubin utility functions U_{LES} and U_{Est} , will first finish such a task.

The above discussion just aims at the revealed preference theory rather than whole ordinal utility theory (e.g. Hicks and Allen, 1934; Hicks, 1939). The concept of utility indifference is a subjective measure presented in the latter. Some earlier experimental studies following the traditional ordinal utility concept did explore this issue by measuring the subjective indifference judgment for some commodity bundles (e.g. Thurstone, 1931; MacCrimmon and Toda, 1969). Nonetheless, they could not deliver clear experimental evidences to confirm the indifference curve sufficiently satisfying all three strict standards convexity, diminishing, and non-intersecting for determining a utility maximization measure in subjects’ performances. Today, the ordinal utility maximization has still remained neither tested nor falsified, or, even, neither testable nor falsifiable. In behavioral economics, elicitation effect, preference reversal, and etc (e.g., Fredrick and Fischhoff, 1998; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983) imposed some restrictions on the ordinal utility concept but are not a thorough negation to it.

There are three utility concepts: cardinal utility, ordinal utility, and revealed preference. They are essentially different as the description of actual psychological processes, and cannot be replaced from each other by treating them only as some mathematical contexts.

2 Experimental design and performance

The following experimental designs refer to a series of probing experiments, conducted during April to

October, 2010.

2.1 Experimental design

There are two experiments, called Exp. 1 and Exp. 2, distinguished by their different types of commodity bundles. In Exp. 1, the trading goods are three between-meal nibble kernels: pistachio, almond, and cashew nut, they are mutually substitutable for most people and easy to compare with each other; and in Exp. 2, the trading items are different three types of goods: apple, pen, and facial tissue, they are mutually un-substitutable in everyday life and difficult to compare with each other. Beside of the difference between their trading goods bundles, the basic designs for Exps. 1 and 2 are the same. Below, take Exp. 1 as an example to illustrate the experimental designs.

Exp. 1 includes two sessions, Session A and Session B. Session A is designed to determine U_{LES} , includes three sets of choices for commodity quantity combinations, labeled Choice I, Choice II, and Choice III, in each of which the pistachio, almond, and cashew nut as three trading items are available for subjects' purchases. Session B measures subjects' utility scales to determine U_{ES} .

2.1.1 Session A in Exp. 1

Below, in Exp. 1, subscripts "I", "II", and "III" always indicate Choices I, II, and III, and subscripts "1", "2", and "3" the pistachio, almond, and cashew nut. The experiment uses Chinese money RMB to price the goods, for succinctness, price p_{ij} , $i=I,II,III$, $j=1,2,3$, for example, "RMB0.50" will often be briefly denoted as "0.50".

In Choice I, subjects are asked to report q_{1j} , $j=1,2,3$, the quantities of three kernels they are willing to buy at assigned prices

$$(p_{I1}, p_{I2}, p_{I3})=(0.50, 0.50, 0.50);$$

in Choices II and III, subjects are also asked to report q_{IIj} and q_{IIIj} , $j=1,2,3$, the quantities of three kernels they are willing to buy at assigned prices

$$(p_{II1}, p_{II2}, p_{II3})=(0.70, 0.30, 0.50) \text{ in Choice II,}$$

and

$$(p_{III1}, p_{III2}, p_{III3})=(0.50, 0.30, 0.70) \text{ in Choice III.}$$

They will deliver the data of q_{ij} $i=I,II,III$, $j=1,2,3$ in three sets of prices. [Solving LES in \$q_{ij}\$, we will obtain three \$U_{LES}\$ s.](#) Choices I, II, and III will provide experimental data to construct three U_{LES} s in three price sets in Exp. 1.

The Klein-Rubin utility function U_{LES} is specifically written as

$$U_{LES} = \sum b_{ij} \ln(q_{ij} - r_{ij}), \quad i=I,II,III, \quad j=1,2,3.$$

Subjects consecutively finish Choices I-III on an answer sheet. This is a real pay-off test. Subjects will be told that they are engaged to pay their choices. Meanwhile, they are encouraged to freely decide to buy or reject one, two, or all three kernels, completely basing on their own interests.

To control subjects' purchases naturally following some budget constraints, in Session A, every subject is restricted to purchase no more than RMB6.60 for each of Choices I, II, and III in Exp. 1. To prevent the subjects who are with too low purchasing desire entering the valid sample, only those who purchase at least 45% the maximal money amount, namely no less than RMB3.00, in a choice bundle will be valid. That is, every valid subject will purchase between RMB3.00-6.60 in a choice bundle in Exp. 1. This is Valid Condition 1.

In addition, the theoretical derivation of utility maximization implies that a subject keeps his

preference consistent in his purchase choices. It is Valid Condition 2. An experiment for testing the utility maximization hypothesis should also provide clear information for it.

In the probing experiments conducted in 2010, observations discovered that a subject's choices might be motivated only by expending assigned maximal money amount RBM6.60 as more as possible but completely neglected his consumption preference. Namely, a subject may be “a purely exhausting consumer”. To judge the subject following Valid Condition 2, a special discrimination is inevitable. You will see in Subsection 2.2.2 that the design of consecutive Choices I-III can be used to reveal whether or not a subject follows Valid Condition 2.

2.1.2 Session B in Exp. 1

Session B will determine U_{Est} through the three steps mentioned in Subsection 1.2. In Session B, U_{Est} is specifically written as

$$U_{Est} = \sum b_{ij} \ln(q_a - r_{ij}), \quad b_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij}(\bar{q}_{ij} - r_{ij})}{\sum p_{ij}(\bar{q}_{ij} - r_{ij})}, \quad i=I,II,III, \quad j=1,2,3,$$

where \bar{q}_{ij} is the average value of q_{ij} observed in Session A. Provided r_{ij} is estimated, U_{Est} will be determined. Session B measures subjects' utility scales (logarithmic laws) $u_{ij}=c_{ij}\ln(q_a-r_{ij})+C_{ij}$, $i=I,II,III$ and $j=1,2,3$, from which we can acquire parameters r_{ij} , $i=I,II,III$ and $j=1,2,3$.

The way of measuring the logarithmic laws is similar to that used in “Meas. 3” of the electrical-power massage experiment (He, 2011): five quantities “4”, “6”, “8”, “10”, and “12” for a kernel with an offered unit price are randomly shown to a subject, then the subject is asked to report his five bid unit prices respectively for the five quantities. The bid unit price is viewed as the subject's utility estimates. The logarithmic law will be obtained by fitting

$$u_{ij}=c_{ij}\ln(q_a-r_{ij})+C_{ij}, \quad i=I,II,III, \quad j=1,2,3$$

in the five assigned quantities and five bid unit prices, where the values of u_{ij} will be given by the five bid unit prices respectively multiplying five corresponding assigned quantities, and the values of q_a will always be given by five assigned quantities “4”, “6”, “8”, “10”, and “12”.

To make U_{Est} comparable with U_{LES} , all offered unit prices in Session B are those having been assigned in Session A. And five assigned quantities “4”, “6”, “8”, “10”, and “12” are determined by considering the average quantities for three kernels subjects chose in the probing experiments.

As the psychophysical measurement, the five given values of q_a and the offered unit prices are stimuli presented, and a subject's bid unit prices are the sensation scaling for these stimuli. In $u_{ij}=c_{ij}\ln(q_a-r_{ij})+C_{ij}$, only the parameter r_{ij} will be useful for determining U_{Est} , the other two parameters c_{ij} and C_{ij} are un-useful.

To ensure the sufficient information necessary for presenting a utility scale, the valid subject at least reports the valid bid unit prices for three of five assigned quantities in each utility scale for two choice bundles that he had chosen in Session A. This is Valid Condition 3.

In order to compare U_{LES} with U_{Est} , a valid subject must provide valid data simultaneously in Choice I and one of Choices II and III in Session A and deliver corresponding utility scales in Session B. This is Valid Condition 4.

The data, at least satisfying Valid Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be valid and will be used in the experimental analyses.

By the way, among invalid subjects for all formal experiments, those who did not buy all three

kernels in Choice I (for they disliked certain kernels) violating Valid Condition 4 occupied a proportion about 50%, those who were judged as “purely exhausting consumers” violating Valid Condition 2 occupied a proportion about 26%, and those who purchased below RMB3.00 in Exp. 1 or below RMB3.60 in Exp. 2 (see Subsection 2.2.3) violating Valid Condition 1 occupied a proportion about 20%.

Utility judgments in Sessions A and B, with the identical character that quantities and prices are all informed to subjects, are the same type of single estimate (He, 2011). It ensures the parameter r_{ij} , contained in the utility scales u_{ij} , obtained from Session B can be compared with subjects’ choice results in Session A.

Now we have separate two ways to estimate Klein-Rubin utility function in the experiment: using p_{ij} and q_{ij} of Session A to solve LES, the Klein-Rubin utility function U_{LES} will be obtained experimentally; and combining \bar{q}_{ij} of Session A with r_{ij} of Session B, another Klein-Rubin utility function U_{Est} will be obtained experimentally. As mentioned above, if U_{LES} agrees with U_{Est} , it will indicate subjects’ choices in the experiment agreeing with their utility maximization estimate. In other words, we are able to test the utility maximization hypothesis by comparing the utility functions obtained from the above two ways.

2.2 Experimental performance

2.2.1 Participants

Two types of subjects participated in experiments: career persons working in the agents of business, school, government, and etc, called C-Sample, and full-time undergraduate students from Jinan University, called S-Sample. C-Sample only participated in Exp. 1, and S-Sample participated in Exps. 1 and 2. Table 1 outlines their status.

Table 1. Status of Each Sample

Sample	Subject	Male	Female	Age	Mean of ages
S-Sample	121	61	60	19-22	20.3
C-Sample	105	47	58	23-39	27.6

2.2.2 Performance of Exp. 1

In Exp. 1, the three kernels respectively contained in mini bags were used as goods traded in the experiment. All mini bags were transparent to show kernels to subjects (see the photo pictures in Part 1 of Supplemental Files [on the journal’s web site http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501](http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501)). A mini bag was a trading unit with same quantities but often different prices between Choices I-III as shown in Table 2. To attract subjects to purchase in the experiment, all prices assigned in Table 2 are usually lower than 30% the market prices.

Table 2. Prices for Mini-Bagged Kernels (RMB)

	Pistachio	Almond	Cashew nut
Choice I	$p_{I1}=0.50$	$p_{I2}=0.50$	$p_{I3}=0.50$
Choice II	$p_{II1}=0.70$	$p_{II2}=0.30$	$p_{II3}=0.50$
Choice III	$p_{III1}=0.50$	$p_{III2}=0.30$	$p_{III3}=0.70$

In Session A, three mini-bagged kernels were shown to subjects. The three sets of prices assigned in Table 2 were shown on a sheet for every subject. The experimenter instructed to them: “This is a quantity-choice test. You are engaged to pay your choices at assigned prices. Everywhere, if you are reluctant to buy a trading item, please feel free to reject it by filling with a zero on the answer sheet. There will be three sets of quantity choices offered to you. In each choice set, there are three kernels with their assigned prices. Your purchase must be no more than ¥6.60 for every set. Otherwise, it will be invalid. You should choose in all Choices I, II, and III. But there will be only one choice set to be finally traded for you, because we shall randomly determine, by a lottery, only one of Choices I, II, and III to be executed. You don’t worry about buying too many kernels in the experiment.”

The designs in Table 2 can be used to examine Valid Condition 2 in subjects’ choices, *i.e. to discriminate the purely exhausting consumer*. It was realized through two steps. The first, revealed a subject’s true preference to three kernels in Choice I, and the second, surveyed whether a subject persists his preference in Choices II and III. In Choice I, the assigned unit prices for all three kernels were the same (all 0.50/bag), the motivation of “expending assigned maximal money amount 6.60 as more as possible” thereby did not disturb a subject’s preference in his choice behaviors, accordingly, the differences between quantities chosen for the three kernels in Choice I would naturally indicate a subject’s different preferences to three kernels. In other words, Choice I would truly reveal a subject’s preference and provide the comparable criteria for surveying a subject’s preference performances.

In the practical performance, if Valid Condition 2 was followed, *for example, in a subject’s Choices I and II, the quantities chosen in Choices I and II would agree certain rules. In Choices I and II, the prices were assigned as follows (see Table 2)*

	Pistachio	Almond	Cashew nut
Choice I	$p_{I1}=0.50$	$p_{I2}=0.50$	$p_{I3}=0.50$
Choice II	$p_{II1}=0.70$	$p_{II2}=0.30$	$p_{II3}=0.50$

For pistachio, the price was 0.50 in Choice I, and 0.70 in Choice II; so if a subject’s choices followed his preference, comparing with the variations in prices of almond and cashew nut, the quantity of pistachio chosen in Choice II should not be at least larger than that chosen in Choice I; otherwise, he did not persist his preference in Choices I and II, *i.e. Valid Condition 2 failed to be fulfilled in his choice behaviors and the data should be discarded. With similar reasoning, the quantity of almond chosen in Choice II should not be at least smaller than that chosen in Choice I. And further, we could also similarly judge a subject’s behaviors between Choice II and Choice III. In this way, we could determine in the main whether a subject’s behaviors satisfied Valid Condition 2 and picked out the purely exhausting consumer.*

To test Valid Condition 2, a valid subject must buy all three kernels in Choice I *to display his true preference to the three kernels* and, simultaneously, at least buy all three kernels in one of Choices II and III *to make his preference displayed in Choice I comparable at least with one other choice bundle*. This requirement has been contained in Valid Condition 4.

Having concluded Session A, those who offered valid data in Session A were selected to proceed to Session B to measure utility scales u_{ij} , $i=I,II,III$ and $j=1,2,3$. In Session B, the experimenter instructed to subjects: “In the just finished choices, you were only allowed to choose quantities but not to choose prices. Now you are allowed to bid prices for each assigned quantity with reference to the offered prices”.

Subjects were asked to report their bid unit prices for five assigned quantities “4”, “6”, “8”, “10”, “12” (counted in mini bag number) with reference to an offered unit price for a kernel. The offered unit prices were those assigned in Session A (see Table 2):

- 0.50/bag and 0.70/bag for pistachio;
- 0.50/bag and 0.30/bag for almond; and
- 0.50/bag and 0.70/bag for cashew nut.

The reported bid unit prices were the utility estimates. They provided data to determine the logarithmic laws for estimating parameters r_{ij} and b_{ij} in U_{Est} .

There were three U_{LES} in Session A respectively describing three Klein-Rubin utility functions in Choices I, II, and III. Every U_{LES} contained three logarithmic terms representing the utilities derived from three kernels; therefore, there were nine logarithmic terms in sum for three U_{LES} . To construct U_{Est} for comparing with U_{LES} , there were also nine utility scales (logarithmic laws) to be estimated. To simplify the measurement procedure, the cross affections between different kernels in a choice bundle were not taken into account in the estimations of U_{Est} , and thus, subjects reported their utility judgments for a kernel only basing on the assigned quantities and offered unit price for this kernel. With this simplification, if the assigned unit prices for a kernel were the same between two choice bundles in Session A, they would be described by the same logarithmic law in the estimations of U_{Est} for the two choice bundles. According to the designs in Table 2, the assigned unit prices

- for pistachio were the same in Choices I and III;
- for almond were the same in Choices II and III; and
- for cashew nut were the same in Choices I and II.

In other words, the pistachio was described by the same logarithmic law in Choices I and III, the almond by the same logarithmic law in Choices II and III, and the cashew nut by the same logarithmic law in Choices I and II. The number of logarithmic laws estimated in Session B was therefore reduced to six. It would greatly increase the valid rate in the experiments (see Subsection 2.4).

From Table 2, the six logarithmic laws estimated in Session B were specified as follows:

- 1) for pistachio with unit price 0.50/bag (assigned in Choice I and III);
- 2) for pistachio with unit price 0.70/bag (assigned in Choice II);
- 3) for almond with unit price 0.50/bag (assigned in Choice I);
- 4) for almond with unit price 0.30/bag (assigned in Choices II and III);
- 5) for cashew nut with unit price 0.50/bag (assigned in Choices I and II);
- 6) for cashew nut with unit price 0.70/bag (assigned in Choice III).

The sets of assigned quantities for three kernels in Session B are the same, and all are 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12.

The above setting factors are summarized in Table 3. There are totally six unit prices and thirty quantities assigned in Table 3 for three kernels.

Table 3. Assigned Quantities and Offered prices in Session B of Exp. 1

Kernel	Offered unit price	Assigned quantities	Measuring utility scales
Pistachio	0.50/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I and III
Pistachio	0.70/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice II
Almond	0.50/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I
Almond	0.30/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice II and III
Cashew nut	0.50/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I and II
Cashew nut	0.70/bag	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice III

To lessen the order effect in subjects' judgments, thirty quantities assigned in Table 3 were randomly ordered one by one to show to subjects in the experiment. Subjects were asked to report their bid unit prices one by one for assigned quantities with reference to offered unit prices. The measurement process is similar to that held in "Meas. 3" of the electrical-power massage experiment (He, 2011): the experimenter presented to a subject a unit price inquiry card, for instance as Fig 1, which means "if you are asked to buy 6 bags of almond with offered unit price 0.30/bag, your bid unit price will be ()"; the subject wrote down his bid unit price in the bracket, and the experimenter collected the card; then the next inquiry card was presented to the subject, the subject reported his bid unit price, and so on, until all thirty inquiry cards (correspond to thirty assigned quantities in Table 3) had been randomly presented to the subject.

Almond: 6 bags
 Unit price: ¥0.30/bag
 Your bid unit price: (¥)

Fig 1. An example for the unit price inquiry card. It means "if you are asked to buy 6 bags of almond with offered unit price 0.30/bag, your bid unit price will be ()".

The data used in curve regressions for measuring utility scales were created by multiplying subjects' bid unit prices with corresponding assigned quantities. For example, if the subject's bid unit price for quantity "10" of "Almond (0.50/bag)" in Choice I was 0.35, it would deliver a datum $0.35 \times 10 = 3.50$ at quantity "10" for the almond utility scale in Choice I. In this case, for the logarithmic law $u_{12} = c_{12} \ln(q_a - r_{12}) + C_{12}$, the subject will deliver a fitted observed value $u_{12} = 3.50$ at $q_a = 10$. This data creating manner identified with subjects' judgment manner in Session A, in which subjects determined their purchase quantity by multiplying the unit price with the purchase quantity to judge the total purchase money amount no more than RMB6.60 in a choice bundle.

To get rid of subjects' worry about buying too many kernels in Session B, the experimenter declared the transaction regulation to them: "For every kind of kernels, only one quantity among assigned quantities will be selected, by a lottery, as executed trade, and if your bid price is between the mode price $\pm 10\%$ for the executed quantity, your trade will be successful, otherwise will not. With this regulation, at most, only three quantities among thirty priced quantities are possible to be traded. Therefore, you just independently bid for every assigned quantity and don't worry about paying too much for cumulative successful trades." Usually, the terminology "mode price" was easily addressed to

subjects. The restriction “between the mode price $\pm 10\%$ ” was used to attract subjects naturally to bid by following his preference with reference to the offered prices but not by simply pressing down prices for saving the expenditure.

2.2.3 Performance of Exp. 2

With the similar designs to Exp. 1, Exp. 2 also contains three sets of choices in its Session A. In Exp. 2, the subscripts “I”, “II”, and “III” also always indicate Choice I, Choice II, and Choice III, and the subscripts “1”, “2”, and “3” the apple, pen, and facial tissue.

Table 4 presents the assigned prices of apple, pen, and facial tissue in Session A, and Table 5 presents the assigned quantities and offered prices in Session B.

Valid Conditions 2, 3, and 4 in Exp. 2 are the same to those in Exp. 1. But Valid Condition 1 requests that all valid subjects purchase between RMB3.60-8.00 in each of Choices I-III in Exp. 2.

Table 4. Prices in Session A of Exp. 2 (RMB)

	Apple	Pen	Facial tissue
Choice I	$p_{I1}=0.50$	$p_{I2}=0.50$	$p_{I3}=0.50$
Choice II	$p_{II1}=0.70$	$p_{II2}=0.90$	$p_{II3}=0.50$
Choice III	$p_{III1}=0.50$	$p_{III2}=0.90$	$p_{III3}=0.70$

Table 5. Assigned Quantities and Offered Prices in Session B of Exp. 2

Goods	Offered unit price	Assigned quantities	Measuring utility scales
Apple	0.50/piece	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I and II
Apple	0.70/piece	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice III
Pen	0.50/piece	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I
Pen	0.90/piece	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice II and III
Facial tissue	0.50/set	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice I and III
Facial tissue	0.70/set	4-6-8-10-12	in Choice II

3 Results

3.1 Results in Exp. 1 of C-Sample

105 subjects participated in C-Sample, and 38 of them delivered valid data in Choice I, 37 in Choice II, and 36 in Choice III.

By solving LES in the category data of Session A, each U_{LES} for Choices I-III of C-Sample is derived as (1), (3), and (5) (for details see Part 2 of Supplemental Files on the journal’s web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>).

To derive U_{Est} , it needs to estimate r_{ij} and b_{ij} .

The first step is to fit the logarithmic law $u_{ij}=c_{ij}\ln(q_{ij}-r_{ij})+C_{ij}$, $i=I,II,III$ and $j=1,2,3$, in the average data of Session B to determine r_{ij} . It was realized by the curve regression in SPSS, in which the optimal values of c_{ij} and C_{ij} in the logarithmic law were created automatically, but the values of r_{ij} must be selected by hand. To isolate from the derivation of U_{LES} , the procedure of selecting r_{ij} was that select the values of r_{ij} to improve the regression results in SPSS until $R^2 \geq 0.97$. Except of the regression curve for the cashew nut in Choices I and II rounding its value of R^2 from 0.965 to 0.97, all other

regression curves are rigorously satisfy $R^2 \geq 0.97$ (see Part 3 of Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>).

The second step is to substitute r_{ij} and \bar{q}_{ij} in $b_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij}(\bar{q}_{ij} - r_{ij})}{\sum p_{ij}(\bar{q}_{ij} - r_{ij})}$ to determine b_{ij} (for details

see Part 3 of Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>). Where \bar{q}_{ij} is the average quantity of q_{ij} subjects chose in Session A. In terms of the average utility, \bar{q}_{ij} maximized the Klein-Rubin utility in Session A.

Using the values of b_{ij} and r_{ij} , each U_{Est} for Choices I-III of C-Sample is derived as (2), (4), and (6).

In Choice I,

$$U_{LES} = 0.31 \ln(q_{I1} - 2.95) + 0.33 \ln(q_{I2} - 2.56) + 0.36 \ln(q_{I3} - 3.49); \quad (1)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.32 \ln(q_{I1} - 2.39) + 0.36 \ln(q_{I2} - 2.30) + 0.36 \ln(q_{I3} - 2.50). \quad (2)$$

In Choice II,

$$U_{LES} = 0.32 \ln(q_{II1} - 0.96) + 0.41 \ln(q_{II2} - 3.11) + 0.28 \ln(q_{II3} - 2.79); \quad (3)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.33 \ln(q_{II1} - 0.96) + 0.40 \ln(q_{II2} - 2.40) + 0.27 \ln(q_{II3} - 2.50). \quad (4)$$

In Choice III,

$$U_{LES} = 0.32 \ln(q_{III1} - 1.81) + 0.33 \ln(q_{III2} - 2.35) + 0.35 \ln(q_{III3} - 0.55); \quad (5)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.26 \ln(q_{III1} - 2.39) + 0.39 \ln(q_{III2} - 2.40) + 0.34 \ln(q_{III3} - 0.55). \quad (6)$$

Table 6. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice I, Exp. 1 of C-Sample

	b_{I1}	b_{I2}	b_{I3}	r_{I1}	r_{I2}	r_{I3}
U_{LES}	0.31	0.33	0.36	2.95	2.56	3.49
U_{Est}	0.32	0.33	0.34	2.39	2.30	2.50

Wilcoxon test: $Z=1.75$, $p=0.08$

Table 7. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice II, Exp. 1 of C-Sample

	b_{II1}	b_{II2}	b_{II3}	r_{II1}	r_{II2}	r_{II3}
U_{LES}	0.32	0.41	0.28	0.96	3.11	2.79
U_{Est}	0.33	0.41	0.26	0.96	2.40	2.50

Wilcoxon test: $Z=1.46$, $p=0.14$

Table 8. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice III, Exp. 1 of C-Sample

	b_{III1}	b_{III2}	b_{III3}	r_{III1}	r_{III2}	r_{III3}
U_{LES}	0.32	0.33	0.35	1.81	2.35	0.55
U_{Est}	0.26	0.39	0.34	2.39	2.40	0.55

Wilcoxon test: $Z=0.81$, $p=0.42$

To get more visual comparisons, Tables 6-8 collect the comparisons between U_{LES} and U_{Est} for the values of b_{ij} and r_{ij} contained in (1)-(6).

The above comparisons reveal an approximate agreement between U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choices I-III, and obviously support the utility maximization hypothesis in Exp. 1 of C-Sample. The average relative error ($\Sigma|U_{LES}'s - U_{Est}'s| \div \Sigma U_{LES}'s$) is 0.06 for b_{ij} , and 0.17 for r_{ij} .

In this estimation approach, the regression curves are only the outcomes satisfying $R^2 \geq 0.97$. In other words, the test of utility maximization in the present study is achieved under the acceptable condition of $R^2 \geq 0.97$ for the curve regression but not under the optimal condition in which R^2 should be taken the maximal value. Here, $R^2 \geq 0.97$ is an acceptable approximate level in this experimental test.

3.2 Results in Exp. 1 of S-Sample

121 subjects participated in S-Sample, and among them, 41 delivered valid data in Choice I, 40 in Choice II, and 39 in Choice III, in Exp. 1.

By solving LES in the category data of Session A, each U_{LES} for Choices I, II, and III in Exp. 1 of S-Sample is derived as (7), (9), and (11) (for details see Part 4 of Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>).

By the similar way to that deriving U_{Est} for C-Sample, each U_{Est} for Choices I, II, and III in Exp. 1 of S-Sample is derived as (8), (10), and (12) (for details see Part 4 of Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>).

In Choice I,

$$U_{LES} = 0.46 \ln(q_{I1} - 2.43) + 0.13 \ln(q_{I2} - 2.97) + 0.38 \ln(q_{I3} - 2.61); \quad (7)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.49 \ln(q_{I1} - 2.21) + 0.17 \ln(q_{I2} - 2.97) + 0.34 \ln(q_{I3} - 2.61). \quad (8)$$

In Choice II,

$$U_{LES} = 0.39 \ln(q_{II1} - 3.14) + 0.25 \ln(q_{II2} - 6.04) + 0.36 \ln(q_{II3} - 3.98); \quad (9)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.09 \ln(q_{II1} - 2.90) + 0.51 \ln(q_{II2} - 2.93) + 0.40 \ln(q_{II3} - 2.61). \quad (10)$$

In Choice III,

$$U_{LES} = 0.41 \ln(q_{III1} - 1.98) + 0.381 \ln(q_{III2} - 2.93) + 0.20 \ln(q_{III3} - 1.72); \quad (11)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.42 \ln(q_{III1} - 2.21) + 0.35 \ln(q_{III2} - 2.93) + 0.12 \ln(q_{III3} - 1.72). \quad (12)$$

Table 9. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice I, Exp. 1 of S-Sample

	b_{11}	b_{12}	b_{13}	r_{11}	r_{12}	r_{13}
U_{LES}	0.46	0.13	0.38	2.43	2.97	2.61
U_{Est}	0.49	0.17	0.34	2.21	2.97	2.61

Wilcoxon test: $Z=0.55$, $p=0.58$

Table 10. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice II, Exp. 1 of S-Sample

	b_{II1}	b_{II2}	b_{II3}	r_{II1}	r_{II2}	r_{II3}
U_{LES}	0.39	0.25	0.36	3.14	6.04	3.98
U_{Est}	0.09	0.51	0.40	2.90	2.93	2.61

Wilcoxon test: $Z=1.36$, $p=0.17$

Table 11. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice III, Exp. 1 of S-Sample

	b_{III1}	b_{III2}	b_{III3}	r_{III1}	r_{III2}	r_{III3}
U_{LES}	0. 41	0. 38	0. 20	1. 98	2. 93	1. 72
U_{Est}	0. 42	0. 35	0. 22	2. 21	2. 93	1. 72

Wilcoxon test: $Z=0.73$, $p=0.47$

Tables 9-11 collect the comparisons between U_{LES} and U_{Est} for the values of b_{ij} and r_{ij} contained in (7)-(12).

Among the eighteen pairwise comparisons shown in Tables 9-11, except of three showing disagreements (the difference is larger than 40%) in Table 10 (indicated by italic and boldfaced figures), fifteen comparisons present an approximate agreement between U_{LES} and U_{Est} . About 83% of the comparisons support the utility maximization hypothesis in Exp. 1 of S-Sample. After omitting the three disagreeing comparisons in Table 10, the average relative error for the rest fifteen comparisons is 0.09 for b_{ij} , and 0.10 for r_{ij} .

The comparisons between U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Tables 9 and 11 support the utility maximization in Choices I and III of Exp. 1 for S-Sample. But in Choice II (Table 10), the disagreeing ones occupy a half of the comparisons. Choice II in Exp. 1 of S-Sample fails in the test.

3.3 Results in Exp. 2 of S-Sample

Among 121 subjects in S-Sample, 28 delivered valid data in Choices I, II, and III of Exp. 2. However, the calculation outcome for the estimation of Choice I diverges, and leads to Choice I failing in the test (see Part 5 of Supplemental Files on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18501>). Thus, only Choices II and III in Exp. 2 will be tested below.

By solving LES in the category data of Session A, each U_{LES} for Choices II and III in Exp. 2 of S-Sample is derived as (13) and (15) (for details please see Part 5 of Supplemental Files).

By the similar way to that deriving U_{Est} for C-Sample, each U_{Est} for Choices I-III in Exp. 2 of S-Sample is derived as (14) and (16) (for details please see Part 5 of Supplemental Files).

In Choice II,

$$U_{LES} = 0.58 \ln(q_{III} - 2.59) + 0.18 \ln(q_{II2} - 0.74) + 0.24 \ln(q_{III3} - 0.77); \quad (13)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.63 \ln(q_{III} - 2.59) + 0.13 \ln(q_{II2} - 0.90) + 0.24 \ln(q_{III3} - 0.77). \quad (14)$$

In Choice III,

$$U_{LES} = 0.52 \ln(q_{III1} - 3.91) + 0.12 \ln(q_{III2} - 1.46) + 0.34 \ln(q_{III3} - 1.72); \quad (15)$$

$$U_{Est} = 0.50 \ln(q_{III1} - 3.25) + 0.26 \ln(q_{III2} - 0.90) + 0.24 \ln(q_{III3} - 1.72). \quad (16)$$

Tables 12 and 13 collect the comparisons between U_{LES} and U_{Est} for the values of b_{ij} and r_{ij} contained in (13)-(16).

Table 12. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice II of Exp. 2

	b_{II1}	b_{II2}	b_{II3}	r_{II1}	r_{II2}	r_{II3}
U_{LES}	0. 58	0. 18	0. 24	2. 59	0. 74	0. 77
U_{Est}	0. 63	0. 13	0. 24	2. 59	0. 90	0. 77

Wilcoxon test: $Z=0.82$, $p=0.41$

Table 13. Comparisons: U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choice III of Exp. 2

	b_{III1}	b_{III2}	b_{III3}	r_{III1}	r_{III2}	r_{III3}
U_{LES}	0.52	0.12	0.34	3.91	1.46	1.72
U_{Est}	0.50	0.26	0.24	3.25	0.90	1.72

Wilcoxon test: $Z=1.21$, $p=0.23$

Except of the comparison of b_{III2} indicating a disagreement (the difference is larger than 40%) in Table 13, overall, they also reveal an approximate agreement between U_{LES} and U_{Est} in Choices II and III respectively, and thus support the utility maximization hypothesis in Exp. 2 of S-Sample. After omitting the disagreeing comparison of b_{III2} in Table 13, the average relative errors is 0.12 for b_{ij} , and 0.14 for r_{ij} .

3.4 Summaries for the experimental results

This is an acceptable experimental test with an acceptable approximate level of $R^2 \geq 0.97$ for the curve regression, but not an optimal experimental test that requires the maximal value of R^2 for the curve regression.

In eight sets of tests (Tables 6~13), except of a Choice II in Exp. 1 (Table 10), the results reveal the approximate but systematic agreements between the paired U_{LES} and U_{Est} at the relative error levels 0.06~0.17 for parameter comparisons. The eight sets of tests contain forty-eight pairs of parameter comparisons in sum, and among them, forty-four pairs deliver agreeing outcomes, occupying a proportion about 92%, four pairs deliver disagreeing results, occupying a proportion about 8%. Overall, the experimental results definitively support the utility maximization hypothesis.

As far as the experiments have revealed, the utility maximization holds for both Exp. 1 using substitutable goods and Exp. 2 using un-substitutable goods. The utility maximization appears robustness in subjects' choice behaviors in the two kinds of commodity bundles.

In the above tests, cross affections between different kernels in a choice bundle were naturally reflected in U_{LES} but, to simplify the experimental procedure, were not taken into account in U_{Est} . U_{Est} was determined by the measures of utility scales that only relied on the assigned quantities and unit prices but were irrelevant to the cross affections between different kernels in a choice bundle. For example, in Choices II and III of Exp. 1 or Exp. 2, r_{II2} and r_{III2} in corresponding U_{Est} are the same because their assigned prices are the same in Choices II and III (see Tables 2 and 4). It should result errors in the comparisons between U_{LES} and U_{Est} in these cases. Among four disagreements (see the italic and boldfaced figures in Tables 10 and 13), three appear in the comparisons of r_{II2} or b_{II2} , which are directly or indirectly determined through utility scales delivering the estimated values of r_{II2} or r_{III2} . Therefore, it can be expected that if these cross affections were taken into account, the agreement in the test would be improved.

In the utility-scale estimate, an easy and feasible treatment for incorporating with the cross affections between different kernels in a choice bundle is that put the unit price information of other two kernels in the same choice bundle together with the inquired kernel in an inquiry card, and let the subject report his bid unit price by comparing with the other two kernels. For example, in Choice II of Exp. 1, the contents of the inquiry card for "the almond with offered unit price 0.30/bag and assigned quantity 6" are changed into "the unit price for pistachio is 0.70/bag and for cashew nut is 0.50/bag, if you are asked to buy 6 bags of almond with offered unit price 0.30/bag, by comparing with the unit

prices of pistachio and cashew nut, your bid unit price will be ()” as shown in Fig. 2.




Fig 2. An example for the changed unit price inquiry card. It means “the unit price for pistachio is 0.70/bag and for cashew nut is 0.50/bag. If you are asked to buy 6 bags of almond with offered unit price 0.30/bag, by comparing with the unit prices of pistachio and cashew nut, your bid unit price will be ()”.

The probing experiments offered some evidences implying that the precision of U_{Est} would be improved greatly in such a treatment. However, the probing experiment also showed that the valid rate would greatly lower to about 6% if this change were introduced in the inquiry card in Exp. 1. The experiment may weaken its representativeness as a measure to normal purchase behaviors at so low a valid rate. The causes of low valid rate may include: 1) in this case, a subject was asked to estimate all nine utility scales that contain forty-five inquiry cards in sum, but usually the valid rate evidently got to decrease when the number of inquiry cards is above twenty five; and 2) too many comparisons in a inquiry card tired the subject.

Another way to improve the test may be that discriminate the preference types by Choice I, and then, respectively test the subsamples basing on different preference categories. It will greatly enhance the precise of U_{LES} and U_{Est} but require a very big sample.

As the first experimental test of cardinal utility maximization and a methodological exploration, I finally chose the simplified program but not the more precise one so that we can concentrate on the fundamental issues. In fact, the simplified experiments have contributed valuable clues to evaluate the test of utility maximization. With the mentioned imperfectness of the simplified test, this paper is of course only an initial probe but, meanwhile, an effective new beginning in the field of utility maximization test.

4 Concluding remarks

4.1 Major findings

The findings in the experimental test can be interpreted from three aspects.

First, we can test cardinal utility maximization by the experiment, and the experimental results support the cardinal utility maximization. It is therefore concluded that the cardinal marginal utility theory has found its empirical foundation in an explicit experimental procedure. It is not only an inspiring evidence but also a methodological progress for the utility maximization thought. Even though it is late for more than one-hundred-fifty years, after all, Gossen’s genius has been eventually combined with and preliminarily supported by the experimental observations.

Second, the linear combination of measurable logarithmic laws for economic judgments is a proper operational definition for Klein-Rubin utility function, furthermore, the utility scaling approach following psychophysics paradigm (e.g., He, 2012; Galanter, 1962, 1990) offers an appropriate measure for the cardinal utility theory. The present study further confirms the conclusion presented in He, 2012: Utility is the subjective quantities of commodities in the utility maximization of LES.

Finally, economics should re-evaluate cardinal utility theory on the basis of behavioral observations. The cardinal utility maximization is not only measurable but also more measurable than the ordinal utility maximization, especially, than the revealed preference maximization. In evident, for multi-commodity choices the cardinal utility maximization can be more clearly, rigorously, and validly tested in a psychophysics-econometrics paradigm than the ordinal one in a pair-wise comparison way that may be disturbed by elicitation effects, preference reversals, and etc (e.g., Fredrick and Fischhoff, 1998; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). A new combining point associating positive behavioral studies with traditional theoretical analyses has emerged, in which classical and contemporary economic thoughts will together contribute their wisdoms on a common stage of the positive theory.

4.2 Emotion utility and perception utility

Bentham's utility is described by pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, and so on, referring to a kind of emotional attribute, can be called "emotion utility"; combining the psychophysical analysis with the econometric modeling discussion, He, 2012 and the present study reveal that utility is the subjective quantity of commodity or evaluation, referring to a kind of perceptual attribute, can be called "perception utility". The utility research should deal with the two utility concepts but not solely Bentham's type.

A corollary derived from econometric models and the present study is that importance of the quantitative perception exceeds the emotional evaluation in one's economic choices. Benthamists perhaps misunderstood an economic choice as an enjoyment choice. In an economic choice, such as purchase choice, exchange choice, and risk choice, the first determinant is "whether it is worth to pay", a comparison between subjective quantities, but not "whether I am pleasant" that is usually seen in an enjoyment choice, such as eating an apple or a bread, watching a football game or a movie, and accepting an unfair proposal or rejecting it, in which one seeks a physiological or psychological gain. The distinction between perception utility and emotion utility comes from and is in turn used to interpret the difference between economic choice and enjoyment choice. The utility analysis should base on the discrimination between economic choice and enjoyment choice.

In the electrical-power massage experiment reported in He, 2012, the instruction addressed to subjects contained the following contents (see page 2 in Supplemental Files for He, 2012 on the journal's web site <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17166>):

Usually there are two types of evaluating massages. One is basing on the degree of your comfortableness, namely, if you feel more comfortableness in a massage, you will evaluate a higher price, and if you feel little comfortableness, you will evaluate a very low price, without referring to the massage duration in time. This is not the evaluating type the experiment wants. Another evaluating type is basing on the massage duration in time. This is the evaluating type the experiment wants. You should price a presented massage by concentrating on the massage duration but not your comfortableness in the experiment. Just like in an electrical-power massage cure, the price is determined only by the massage duration but not one's

comfortableness. We want to know how you intuitively evaluate price only basing on the massage consumption quantity.

Such an instruction obviously let subjects judge by the perception utility, and thus, subjects delivered their utility estimates identified with the forms of sensation scale in psychophysics in the electrical-power massage experiment (He, 2012). Nevertheless if subjects had been instructed to evaluate the massage by their comfortableness, i.e., by their emotion utility, subjects would have reported their utility estimates without any regularity, which was indeed the observed results. In other words, perception and emotion utilities are two different types of judgments, and the former follows psychophysical rules but the latter not. We have experimentally verified the perception utility maximization. Does emotion utility maximization exist? Certainly, it is important to discriminate emotion and perception utilities.

Benthamists and econometricians had respectively worked in the two different domains long ago. The perception utility has broadly used in economic empirical and experimental studies to determine utility functions or value functions in various models, such as the econometric models (e.g. Stone, 1954; Liuch, 1973) and risk-choice models (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). Whether “emotion” itself means “irrational”, and is there the utility maximization model for the enjoyment choice? We should perhaps take into account such a possibility that the emotion utility exists but no maximization can be made for it.

In Galanter (e.g. 1962)’s study, he asked subjects to report a money amount matching to a double happiness that a gift of \$10, \$100, or \$1,000 would bring them, and derived a power function, a typical psychophysical law, from his experimental data. That is a perception utility measure converted from emotion utility by the instruction such as “a double happiness that a gift of \$10, \$100, or \$1,000 would bring you”. Emotion utility and perception utility seem not completely irrelevant. However, how do we see the difference between “a double happiness” and a simple “comfortableness”? “A double happiness” seems not a natural judgment appearing in choice behaviors but a simple “comfortableness” seems more natural. They have so distinct effects in utility estimates. We perhaps know little about the properties of emotion utility.

The present study only discussed the Klein-Rubin utility maximization model in depth, are the utility functions contained in other econometric utility maximization models also construct-able and measurable in a perception utility framework?

Current ultimatum games used mixed utility judgments, in which unfair feelings (related with enjoyment choice) mix with some monetary return (related with economic choice). Could we conceive an ultimatum game mainly involving the emotion utility judgment or perception utility judgment singly so that we can depart the emotion effect and perception effect in bargaining behaviors? Furthermore, how do the emotion utility and perception utility affect the difference of responders’ rejection behaviors between the moderate and very high stake sizes (e.g. Andersen et al., 2011)?

And so on.

We may just begin, and we will need more knowledge to clarify the attributes and functions of the emotion utility and perception utility.

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