Discussion Paper

No. 2012-15 | March 05, 2012
Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access

Abstract

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature’s standard assumption that “money buys policies”. Our model – in which influence-seeking requires both money to “buy access” and managerial time to “utilize access” — offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the “money-buys-policies” assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.

JEL Classification

F16 H0 L1

Cite As

Wolfgang Mayer and Sudesh Mujumdar (2012). Lobbying: Buying and Utilizing Access. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2012-15, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2012-15

Assessment



Comments and Questions


Anonymous - Referee Report 1
July 30, 2012 - 17:00

See attached file


Anonymous - Referee Report 2
July 30, 2012 - 17:01

See attached file


Anonymous - What happened to this paper?
September 30, 2012 - 17:51

The editorial decision about this paper (which appears excellent to me) seems to be still outstanding. If no decision has been made in the meanwhile, this would not conform to this journal's goals; if it has been rejected, conditionally or unconditionally, in the spirit of open assessment it would be ...[more]

... good make the reasons openly available by publishing the decision letter.


Editorial Office - Status of the Paper
October 01, 2012 - 09:45

We asked the authors to send their replies to the referee reports.