Discussion Paper
Nr. 2010-7 |
February 04, 2010
Chance of Revolts and Ability of Oppressions: A Comment on the Acemoglu–Robinson Model
Abstract
In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an interesting argument follows: if the likelihood of successful oppression is sufficiently larger than a certain level of destruction rate and there are cheap-but-effective devices such as biochemicals, citizens in a dictatorial country may have a trade-off between economic prosperity and domestic military threats.
Citation
Tetsuya Saito (2010). Chance of Revolts and Ability of Oppressions: A Comment on the Acemoglu–Robinson Model. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2010-7.
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2010-7
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Dear the anonymous referee
First of all, I am really appreciated for the helpful and insightful comments. Thank you very much.
Through out writing this paper, I have wondered whether or not to make it a full paper or to keep it as a commentary note. I made ...[more]
... a decision to make it a comment, and references to relevant works are actually omitted to make it as concise as possible focusing on the mathematical structure (I have also shortened the introduction for this purpose).
I'll have to redeem the reference list as well as some revisions.
Thank you very much again,
Tetsuya Saito