Discussion Paper

No. 2008-7 | March 13, 2008
Corruption and Political Competition

Abstract

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

JEL Classification

D72 D73

Cite As

Richard Damania and Erkan Yalcin (2008). Corruption and Political Competition. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2008-7, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-7

Assessment



Comments and Questions


Anonymous - Comment
April 10, 2008 - 10:40

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Anonymous - Referee Report
April 24, 2008 - 11:16

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Anonymous - Referee Report
April 25, 2008 - 09:24

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