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    <dc:publisher>Economics: The Open-Access, Open Assessment E-Journal</dc:publisher>
    <dc:publisher>http://www.economics-ejournal.org</dc:publisher>
    <dc:language>en</dc:language>

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<dc:creator>Ralph Chami</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Sunil Sharma</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ilhyock Shim</dc:creator>
<dc:title>A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement</dc:title>
<dc:date>2007-07-09</dc:date>
<dc:description>The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful
role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is
examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF ´ s objective is to
safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan
contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such
contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan ´ s dilemma and
time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear ´ s
dilemma.   Paper submitted to the special issue " Recent Developments in International Money
and Finance " edited by Ronald MacDonald</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-26</dc:identifier>
<dc:subject>JEL D82</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>JEL F02</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>JEL F33</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>JEL G22</dc:subject>


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